Cultural Transmission in the Long, Long Run: Evidence from a Natural Experiment by Chaudhary, Latika et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2017-03
Cultural Transmission in the Long, Long Run:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Chaudhary, Latika; Rubin, Jared; Iyer, Sriya; Shrivastava, Anand
Chaudhary, Latika, et al. Cultural Transmission in the Long, Long Run: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment. Working Paper, 2017.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/59406
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Cultural Transmission in the Long, Long Run:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment∗
Latika Chaudhary,† Jared Rubin,‡ Sriya Iyer,§ and Anand Shrivastava¶
March 2017
Preliminary and Incomplete. Please do not cite without permission.
Abstract
We conduct a standard public goods game in three towns in the Indian state of
Rajasthan. These towns were assigned to opposite sides of a colonial border separat-
ing British India from the Princely States. One town fell on the British India side of
the border on account of military conquest, unrelated to any geographic or commercial
advantages. We find that participants of the former Princely State town make lower
contributions to mixed groups composed of two home town participants and two partic-
ipants from the British India town. More importantly, we find these effects are driven
by participants with strong family ties to the town, either their parents or grandparents
are from the town. We believe these differences reflect institutional differences in the
presence of outsiders and local governance between the Princely States and British In-
dia in Rajasthan, and that the historical exposure to such institutions has been passed
down through the generations.
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1 Introduction
Although social scientists have long recognized the importance of culture, economists have
been slow to embrace cultural explanations of economic outcomes. That said a small and
growing economics literature has begun to study culture, its determinants and its persis-
tence over the last few decades.1 In a classic study Putman et al. (1993) study how different
measures of social capital affect the performance of regional governments within Italy. Re-
gions that were exposed to “free cities” that promoted early forms of democracy and public
goods provision were different from cities that were not historical “free cities”. In their study
cultural traits of cooperation were intergenerationally transmitted within regions.
Other studies have correlated the experience of second generation immigrants to their
home country for a variety of outcomes. For example, Algan and Cahuc (2010) exploit
variation in immigration patterns to the United States to identify the inherited component
of trust and test its impact on economic outcomes. Giuliano (2007) shows that southern
European immigrants to the United States are more likely to stay with their parents as adults
compared to northern European immigrants. These differences in living arrangements are
similar to those observed in Europe. Her findings suggests that culture accounts for the
stylized facts more than any economic explanation.
Giuliano and Nunn (2016) provide further insight into intergenerational cultural trans-
mission showing that groups whose ancestors lived in more stable environments place a
greater emphasis today on maintaining tradition. On the theoretical side, a large literature
has looked at the mechanisms by which cultural transmission happens. For example, Bisin
and Verdier (2001), and Guiso et al. (2008) focus primarily on the intra-family transmission
process, while Dohmen et al. (2012) highlight assortative matching and the local environ-
ment. Our paper relates to this broader literature by studying the effect of culture as shaped
by historical institutions on individual decision-making in an experimental context.
In this paper, we combine a “lab in the field” experiment with a natural experiment. We
run simple public goods games in three towns on either side of an old colonial Indian border
in the present state of Rajasthan. This border separates the former province of Ajmer, part
of British India, from the adjoining states of Kishangarh and Shahpura, part of Princely
India. We focus on three small towns namely Kekri (Ajmer province in British India),
Sarwar (Kishangarh State in Princely India) and Shahpura (Shahpura State in Princely
India). These towns are remarkably close together less than 50 kilometers from each other.
Historically they were small towns with populations from 4,000 to 9,000. They continue to
1Guiso et. al (2006), Nunn (2012), Alesina and Giuliano (2015) among others provide excellent reviews
of culture and its ties to institutions.
remain small today with populations ranging from 20,000 to 40,000 as of 2011.
In the pre-colonial period, this part of central Rajasthan shared a common language,
culture and geography. Ajmer came under direct colonial rule in the early 19th century
when the East India Company won an important battle against the Marathas (a Hindu
state that emerged following the decline of the Mughal Empire). This lead one of the
Maratha leaders to cede the territory of Ajmer province to the East India Company. The
adjoining states of Kishangarh and Shahpura entered into treaties with the British whereby
the British controlled their defense and foreign policy, but the local rulers were allowed to
manage their internal administration. Historical records suggest the decision to bring Ajmer
under direct colonial rule was on account of winning the battle and the strategic location of
Ajmer city, the capital. Commercial and agricultural reasons were unimportant here because
this region was not agriculturally productive. It was near the Thar dessert, arid with low
and unpredictable rainfall. Kekri, our experimental town, was on the south-eastern edge of
Ajmer province. By most accounts it was a small and inconsequential town that happened
to come under direct colonial rule.
In contrast the nearby towns of Sarwar and Shahpura came under the control of their
respective Princely States. On account of their proximity to each other, the colonial expe-
rience of these towns was not that different. All three had access to the same technology.
They enjoyed somewhat secure property rights. Schools, hospitals and jails were present
in all three. But, the British Indian town differed from the Princely towns in two ways.
First, Kekri in British India was exposed to more foreigners with British officials playing
a salient role in administration. Second, Kekri also had a more modern municipal board
that taxed consumption in the town to fund public services. In contrast, local governance
was more centralized in Sarwar and Shahpura where the ruler and his advisors made im-
portant tax and spending decisions. Hence, people from Kekri were more familiar and used
to working with outsiders. They also had a longer historical experience with local taxation
and governance. Soon after independence Kekri and Sarwar came under the same district
administration of Ajmer, while Shahpura is under the neighboring district of Bhilwara. All
three towns have been a part of Rajasthan state since 1956.
Our results suggest that historical institutions affect contemporary cooperation and that
there exists some intergenerational transmission mechanism. First, we find that participants
of Sarwar on the Princely India side of the border are less likely to cooperate (i.e., contribute
lower amounts) in mixed groups compared to participants in Kekri. In both towns the mixed
groups include two people from the home town and two people from the other town (Kekri
or Sarwar). When we split the sample based on a participants’ ties to their town, we find
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the inter-town differences are driven by individuals whose parents are from the town. We
find similar results if we split the sample based on whether a participant has lived in the
town their entire life, or if their grandparents are from the town. We find no significant
difference in contributions for individuals without any family ties to the towns.
We also ran mixed group experiments for participants in Sarwar and Shahpura. Here
again the mixed group is two people from the home town and two people from the other
town (Sarwar or Shahpura). If the differences we observe between Kekri and Sarwar are
driven by the colonial boundary, we would not expect to observe differences in contributions
to mixed groups across the two Princely State towns. Indeed the results confirm that the
relevant difference is between British and Princely India. We find no significant differences
in contributions to mixed groups between Sarwar and Shahpura. Taken together we inter-
pret these results as evidence of an inter-generational transmission of culture. Only those
participants whose grandparents are from these towns and were presumably raised with
Princely State institutions cooperate less in mixed groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the historical background
of the natural experiment we exploit in this paper. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and implementation details. Section 4 offers a theoretical framework, which generates
predictions for the experiments. Section 5 presents the experimental results, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Where and Why of The Natural Experiment?
2.1 Locations
Our “lab in the field” experiment exploits a historical boundary of British India versus
Princely India. During the colonial period, the British directly controlled roughly two-thirds
of the Indian subcontinent. The remaining territories, known as Princely States or Native
States, came under the rule of various hereditary kings. Such states negotiated treaties
with the British whereby they continued to exist as independent states while recognizing
the “supreme authority of the British Government” (House of Commons 1913, p. 14). As a
rule Princely States were not allowed to engage in political or military relations with other
Princely States. In exchange for giving the British control over their defense and foreign
policy, the colonial government allowed them to manage their local administration. Figure 1
shows a historical map of India differentiating between the Princely States and British India.
As seen the Princely States were scattered throughout the country with larger concentrations
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in western and central India.2
Our focus is on the historical boundary of British and Princely India in the present day
state of Rajasthan in north-western India. We selected this region because the historical ev-
idence suggests British annexation here was a function of military conquest and not inherent
agricultural and commercial advantages. In the colonial period, much of Rajasthan (called
Rajputana then) was divided into numerous Princely States under the control of patrilineal
clans known as Rajputs.3 These states had pre-colonial roots predating the arrival of Euro-
peans. They nominally came under the control of the Mughal empire in the 16th and 17th
centuries, but Rajput rulers retained strong local autonomy by marrying their daughters to
Mughal emperors (Ramusack 2004).
As the Mughal empire declined in the 18th century, parts of this region came under
the control of the Marathas.4 Following years of payments to the Marathas and frequent
attacks by Maratha associated raiders (known as Pindaris), the Rajput states solicited
military help from the English East India Company in the early 19th century. The Company
defeated the Marathas and the Pindaris. As a result the Maratha leader Daulat Rao Sindhia
ceded the central part of the region namely Ajmer to the British in 1818. The remaining
Rajputana States surrounding Ajmer signed treaties with the Company guaranteeing their
local independence and status as Princely States.
Our experiments target three towns located along this historical border of the Ajmer
province of British India and two Princely States immediately surrounding Ajmer namely
Kishangarh and Shahpura. Kekri, the town in former British India, is historically part of
the Kekri sub-division in the south-eastern portion of Ajmer. Sarwar, a town in the former
Princely State of Kishangarh, lies 17 kilometers north-west of Kekri. And, Shahpura, the
2As the Mughal Empire declined in the early 18th century, many regional states emerged to replace
Mughal rule. The strongest of these states (the Maratha Dominion in western India, Hyderabad in the
Deccan plateau, and Mysore in southern India) wrestled for control with the East India Company. After
multiple battles and alliances with regional powers, the Company emerged triumphant by the early 19th
century with the largest territories under their command. British India included the coastal provinces of
Bengal, Bombay, and Madras and the alluvial plains along the Ganga river valley. Most of north India
also came under direct British control by mid-19th century. The Company initially set up trading posts in
Indian ports under the patronage of Mughal emperors. Hence the early territories to come under British
rule were along the coast. As they gradually annexed new territory over the next 100 years, the British
favored agriculturally or commercially advanced regions. Arid desserts in the west and parts of central India
with low agriculture potential were intentionally left under the control of local rulers.
3Rajputs claim to descend from the warrior Hindu castes. But scholars continue to debate their historical
origins (Ramusack 2004).
4The Maratha Empire was a Hindu Empire that rose from western India to control vast territory in the
18th century. In the early years of the late 17th century, the Marathas were constantly fighting the Mughal
Empire but towards the end of their rule in the early 19th century, they were in constant battles with the
East India Company.
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capital of the former Princely State of Shahpura, lies 46 kilometers southwest of Kekri.
Figure 2 shows a historical map of Rajasthan with the princely towns (Sarwar and Shah-
pura) circled in red and the British India town (Kekri) circled in blue. Figure 3 shows a
contemporary map of their locations.
We selected these towns because they are located in close proximity to each other, were
of comparable size and shared a common history before Kekri came under direct British rule.
Both states were small states carved out of the larger Rajput states of Ajmer and Jaipur in
the Mughal period. Jaipur was a state adjoining Ajmer, similar in culture and geography.5
In both cases the original founders received these lands as a reward from Mughal emperors
for their military service.
Kishangarh was founded by the Rathor clan of Rajputs that ruled the larger state of
Jodhpur to the west of Ajmer. On account of a family feud, the original founder (Kishan
Singh) moved from Jodhpur to Ajmer. In 1611 the Mughal Emperor Akbar gave him some
villages to rule that were part of the neighboring Jaipur state. Recall, the Rajputana states
were under Mughal rule in this period. Kishan Singh named this area Kishangarh and
established a town of the same name as his capital city. In the early 18th century, the
area of Sawar again drawn from Jaipur was added to Kishangarh again as a reward to the
current ruler of Kishangarh for providing military service to Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah
I. Similarly, the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan rewarded the founder of Shahpura with land
that was part of the crown lands of Ajmer.6
Against this background, the historical boundary separating Kekri in British India from
Sarwar and Shahpura in Princely India was a function of military conquest unrelated to
specific local features of these towns. Although the city of Ajmer, the capital city of Ajmer
province, was an important historical city because of its central location, this was certainly
not true for Kekri a small town on the outskirts of Ajmer province.
Table 1 summarizes information on population on these towns from the 1931 census. All
three towns were classified as Class V municipalities with populations of 5,000 to 10,000.
They also had similar proportions of Hindus and Muslims. After Indian independence in
1947, Ajmer became a Class “C” state that came under the Central Government. However, it
was converted into a district of Rajasthan in 1956 as part of the Indian States Reorganization
Act. At the time, Sarwar was merged to Ajmer district. So Kekri and Sarwar have been
5Similar to our approach, Verghese (2016) selected Jaipur and Ajmer districts for a matched qualitative
comparison to assess the effect of direct colonial rule on post-colonial conflicts in these areas. He also
highlights their shared history, language and culture.
6Shahpura was considered a Chiefship Princely State, namely a lower administrative group of Princely
States.
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under the same district administration for 60 years now. The town of Shahpura has been
part of the neighboring district of Bhilwara since independence. As of the 2011 census, these
are still small towns with populations ranging from 20,000 to 40,000.
2.2 Why is the Historical Colonial Boundary Important?
Our historical boundary allows us to study whether individuals on either side of this border
behave differently today in controlled public goods experiments. A large literature has
studied the effects of colonialism across the world and in India. One one side of the debate
scholars point to the negative effects of extractive colonial policies such as weak property
rights and specific arguments regarding the drain of Indian resources to Britain. On the
other side scholars point to beneficial effects of securing peace and access to new technology
such as railways.
In our context, these small colonial towns had secure property rights by most accounts.
They also had access to similar technology. All three towns had post and telegraph offices.
They were situated close to the Rajputana-Malwa railways. They had a few schools and
a small police force. But, there were two key differences. First, the presence and role of
outsiders, particularly foreigners, was more salient in Kekri than Sarwar or Shahpura in
Princely India. Although Europeans accounted for less than 1 percent of the population in
colonial India, they were disproportionately located in British India. Here, British officials
served as district officers, magistrates and chairmen of municipal committees interacting
regularly with the local population. This is especially true in the cities and small towns of
colonial British India as compared to in rural villages.
In 1931, the province of Ajmer had 1524 British subjects of which 509 were residing in
Ajmer city, the capital. Since the province had only 5 towns, it is likely the 1000 remaining
British subjects were living in the other towns including Kekri.7 In comparison, there was
only one British subject living in the capital city of Kishangarh in Kishangarh Princely State
in 1931. Our experiment towns of Sarwar and Shahpura had no British or foreign presence.
Hence, Kekri in British India was exposed to more foreign outsiders than the Princely towns
of Sarwar and Shahpura.
Second, local government was more developed in Kekri as compared to the Princely
India towns. After the Indian mutiny in 1857 and the subsequent transfer of power from
the East India Company to the British Crown, the colonial government decentralized the
management of roads and other public services to local bodies in British India. Urban
municipal boards were established in the 1860s and 1870s in most urban towns. For ex-
7The Census of 1931 does not record the number of Europeans in the other towns of Ajmer province
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ample, the Kekri municipality was established in 1879. Similar to other municipal boards
of British India, Kekri funded itself via an octroi tax on consumption goods brought into
the town. According to the Administration Report of Ajmer-Mewara for 1899-1900, octroi
taxes accounted for 82% of municipal revenues. Rental income from lands and buildings
was the other major revenue source at 12%. Kekri spent these municipal funds on fourteen
categories of expenditures ranging from administration, lighting and police to social public
services such as medical dispensaries and schools. The board had nine nominated members
that met two to four times a year.
Such municipal boards were less common in our experiment towns of Princely India.
Even when they existed as in Kishangarh city there is no mention of town-level taxation.
In both Kishangarh and Shahpura Princely States, a majority of state revenues came from
land taxes. A council of a few ministers would advise the ruler on revenue collection,
judicial matters and public expenditures. Decisions were more centralized in Princely towns
compared to Kekri. The historical records mention a municipal committee established in
Kishangarh, the capital city of Kishangarh, but there is no mention of such a committee in
Sarwar. Even in the capital city the committee provided fewer services as compared to in
Kekri. Per the Imperial Gazetteer (1908), the Kishangarh “municipal committee, established
in 1886, attend to the lighting, conservancy, and slaughter-house arrangements.” Schools
and hospitals were funded directly by the state out of its revenues. As of 1908 Shahpura
did not have a municipal board or similar committee. Here again the ruler made spending
decisions in concert with one advisor. There is no mention of local town-specific taxes to
fund local services.
Thus, Kekri on the British India side of the border has been historically exposed to
outsiders and experienced more developed local governance as compared to Sarwar and
Shahpura on the Princely India side. After independence these towns have been under the
common state governance of Rajasthan. And, in the case of Kekri and Sarwar they have also
been under the same local governance of Ajmer district. Against this historical background,
our goal is to test if this boundary has any effects on individual cooperation and contribution
to joint public goods today.
3 Experiment Details
3.1 Experiment Design
Our game is the standard version of the linear public goods game that has been played in
labs across the United States and Europe (Ledyard 1995, Andreoni 1988). Participants from
7
the three towns played the same public goods game three times. In each game, they were
first told they were a part of a group of four members, drawn either from their own town
or some combination of their town and one of the other two towns. While they knew the
towns of the other group members, they were not told the names of any member of their
group. This information was recorded on a spreadsheet and even the experimenters did not
know the group membership.
In the game, each participant was given an endowment of 150 rupees to be split between
an individual pot and a joint pot. The participant made only one decision on how much to
contribute to the joint pot. Participants could contribute either 0, 50, 100 or the complete
150 rupees to the joint pot. They were instructed to circle any number from 0, 50, 100 or 150
representing this contribution as shown in Figure 4. We then doubled the joint contributions.
So each individual’s total earnings were the sum of their individual contribution plus a
quarter of the doubled group contribution. Since there is low and varying levels of education
in India, we used discrete rupee amounts as opposed to the more standard terminology of
tokens, so subjects would not have to make an extra calculation from tokens to monetary
earnings. After explaining the game using text and pictures, the experimenters reviewed a
simple quiz to ensure subjects understood the game.8
Subjects played the game three times. In experiment (A), participants were told they
would be placed in groups with other members of their town. In experiment (B) and (C),
participants were told they would be placed in a group with one member from their town
and two from one of the other towns. Table 2 describes the experiment treatment for each
town. Other than the change in group composition, the experiments were identical. Our
set-up can thus be viewed as a repeated single-shot version of the standard linear game with
different own and other town group combinations.
Many studies have found that repeated public good games lead to decay in subsequent
rounds with lower contributions to the joint account. To address this concern, half the
participants in each town were randomly assigned to play the experiments in order ABC,
and the other half were assigned to play in order BAC. We control for order effects and
cluster the standard errors by town and experiment order in all the regressions. After
playing the games the subjects completed a short demographic survey.9
8Experiments reviewed each quiz question until the subjects could perform the simple calculations adding
together their individual and group contribution under different scenarios.
9Please see the Appendix for the experiment instructions, quiz, and pictorial representations of the game.
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3.2 Implementation in Rajasthan
We hired Indicus Analytics (part of Nielsen India), an economics research firm based in
New Delhi, to conduct the experiments across the three towns in Rajasthan in October
2016. Before the actual experiments, two Nielsen researchers, one of us and a team of
experimenters carried out a pilot experiment in the town Tijara located in another district
of Rajasthan. This was done in September 2016. We selected Tijara because it was similar
in size (population 20,000) as the actual experiment towns.
In preparation for the experiments, the Neilsen team secured the necessary approvals and
informed local officials in each town including the police commissioner about the exercise.
We never discussed why these towns were selected with the Nielsen team. And as far
as we know they were unaware of the historical boundaries between the towns. This is
especially true for Kekri and Sarwar, which are located in the same district today. Since
both experimenters and subjects were blind, we are more confident our results are driven
by differences between British India and Princely India.
The Nielsen team secured similar local facilities in each town to conduct the actual
experiments. We instructed Neilsen to recruit 200 participants 18 years or older per town.
Local recruiters used the same script namely informing individuals that they [Nielsen] are
running an experiment on how people make decisions on behalf of researchers in India,
the UK and USA. If they agree to participate, they would receive 100 rupees ($1.50) with a
potential to earn more money. If individuals expressed an interest in participating, they were
given information on the day and time of the experiments. Nielsen recruited the subjects a
day or two in advance of the actual experiments. On account of the Indian setting of small
towns with lower levels of schooling, the experiments were individually conducted over two
days per town. Each experimenter used the same instructions to explain the experiment,
showed the pictures explaining the experiment and reviewed the quiz questions. After the
subjects circled their choices, the experimenter entered their responses to the short survey.
In each town the process took an hour per person and around 100 individuals played the
experiments per day. Participants were paid their participation fee in cash on the day of
the experiment. Nielsen staff returned a week later to pay the experimental earnings.
In Sarwar the experiments were conducted on October 4th and 5th. In Shahpura they
were conducted on October 8th and 9th. In Kekri 154 experiments were conducted on
October 6th and 7th. We were unable to complete the remaining 46 subject experiments
on the 7th because other unrecruited people from the town showed up at the experiment
facility wanting to participate. Since they had not been recruited and were calling on more
people to participate, the Nielsen team paused the experiments for the day. They returned
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on October 20th to complete the individual-experiments for the remaining 46 people. It
is possible there was local chatter in Kekri about these experiments between October 7th
and the 20th that influenced individual decisions for the October 20th participants. Hence,
we drop these 46 individuals from the analysis. Appendix Table 1 shows the main results
including these individuals with an indicator variable to separate them from the other Kekri
participants. The results are largely the same.
4 Theory and Predictions
Participants in each village played three standard public goods games. In these games, they
are given an endowment of W , choose to contribute yi to the joint account (i.e., public
good), and they keep with they do not contribute, i.e., W − yi. Their contributions to the
joint account are multiplied by some multiple x > 1, and the joint account is distributed







. In our experiment, W = 150, x = 2 and N = 4. The choice yi is
limited to the set {0, 50, 100, 150}. As long as 0 < x
N
< 1, the money-maximizing dominant
strategy of this single-shot game is yi = 0, or the free-riding outcome.
However, there is a large literature suggesting that people give much more than the free-
riding Nash equilibrium in public goods games (Ledyard 1995). There may be any number
of behavioral reasons why people contribute, including altruism, anticipated reciprocity, or
“warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990). With respect to our experiment, this entails that there may
be differences in the amount contributed between towns given their different histories with
respect to public good provision and interaction with outsiders.
Our experimental design permits a “treatment” group and a “control” group. Our treat-
ment comparison is Kekri and Sarwar. These two towns were on opposite sides of the old
border, with Kekri in British India and Sarwar in a Princely State. Moreover, they are
now part of the same administrative district, meaning that any attitudes towards public
goods are not merely reflective of modern governance. The control comparison is Sarwar
and Shahpura. They were both located in Princely States. They serve as a useful control
because it is possible that people in Sarwar and Kekri act differently with respect to pub-
lic good provision for reasons unrelated to historical governance. If this is true, we would
also expect differences to arise in the comparison between Sarwar and Shahpura. Yet, our
framework suggests that participants in Sarwar and Shahpura should act similarly in the
various public goods games. Hence, in all of our predictions we expect no difference in the
actions of participants from Sarwar and Shahpura.
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We can make a clean prediction with regard to public good contributions when partic-
ipants are “mixed”, meaning that there are two from one town and two from another. For
the Kekri-Sarwar treatment, the appropriate comparison is the participants’ decisions in
experiment (B), in which they were all placed in groups comprised of two members from
Kekri and two members from Sarwar. For the Sarwar-Shahpura control treatment, the ap-
propriate comparison is the participants’ decisions in experiment (C), in which they were all
placed in groups comprised of two members from Sarwar and two members from Shahpura.
The history described in Section 2 suggests that people who lived in the Princely States
were less likely to cooperate with outsiders than people from British India. As noted foreign
British influence and presence was less common in Princely India. In British India, an out-
side foreign government dominated day-to-day affairs such as administration and resolving
disputes in local courts. This was particularly true in towns. On the other hand, rulers
of Princely States along with a few advisors managed local governance and administration.
While they may have borrowed ideas and laws from neighboring British India, the imple-
mentation was centralized by their local Indian ruler. Cooperation with outsiders was not
as necessary. Princely State towns also had less experience with local taxation and the local
provision of public services. Urban municipal boards were more common and developed in
British Indian towns. To the extent that these institutional differences became imbued in
local culture, and to the extent that this culture was transmitted to the present day, we
expect the following prediction to arise:
Prediction 1: Participants from Sarwar will contribute less when grouped with outsiders
than will participants from Kekri. However, participants from Sarwar and Shahpura will
contribute the same amount when grouped with outsiders.
Predictions regarding cooperation with fellow towns persons are less clean. For both the
Kekri-Sarwar treatment and the Sarwar-Shahpura treatment, the appropriate comparison is
the participants’ decisions in experiment (A), in which participants were all placed in groups
consisting of four people from their town. On the one hand, if the cultural attributes laid
out in Prediction 1 spill over into cooperation with fellow towns persons, then we would
expect contributions to be lower in Sarwar than in Kekri. On the other hand, the fact
that options with outsiders may have been more limited in the Princely States may have
made cooperation with insiders all the more valuable (Greif 1994; Rubin and Karaja 2017).
If this effect dominates the former effect, we would expect contributions to be higher in
Sarwar than in Kekri. Our experiment is not designed to allow us to parse out these two
opposing effects, so we cannot make a clean prediction regarding cooperation with fellow
towns persons.
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However, we can make a clean statement about the relative amount participants con-
tribute when in groups comprised of fellow towns persons relative to the amount they con-
tribute when in mixed groups. The logic above suggests that participants from Princely
States may contribute less to fellow towns persons than participants from British India, but
this will be mitigated in part (or fully) by cooperation with insiders being more valuable.
Combined with Prediction 1, this suggests that participants from Princely towns should
contribute relatively more to insiders than to mixed groups. This logic is formalized as
follows:
Prediction 2: Participants from Sarwar will contribute more when grouped with fellow
towns persons relative to outsiders than will participants from Kekri. However, there will
be no difference in contributions between the two types of groups for participants from
Sarwar and Shahpura.
Citizens of Kekri, Sarwar, and Shahpura have not lived under British or Princely rule for
seventy years. Hence, if we find the expected differences in contributions between the three
towns, the must be some cultural transmission mechanism at work. The most commonly
accepted mechanism in the economics literature is the one proposed by Bisin and Verdier
(2001), in which parents transmit their preferences to their children as a form of ‘parental
altruism’ (also see Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Dohmen et al. 2012; Giuliano and Nunn
2016; Rubin and Karaja 2017). These preferences then spread through the population, and
the cultural and social environment in which children live determine the probability that
those traits persist in equilibrium.
While we cannot speak to this exact mechanism, given the simplicity of our experiment,
our questionnaire does allow us to test an implication of the Bisin and Verdier model. In
their model, the family plays a role in transmitting cultural values to children (as opposed to
the alternative case, where there is no investment from the family and children pick up their
culture from the community). In this case, people whose families have lived in the village
for multiple generations are more likely to have the cultural traits predicted in Predictions
1 and 2. To test this conjecture, the questionnaire administered after the experiment asked
participants how long their families have lived in the village in question. The logic laid out
above suggests that participants whose families have lived in the town longer should be more
likely to act as predicted in Predictions 1 and 2.
Prediction 3: If the primary cultural transmission mechanism is intra-family and inter-
generational, Predictions 1 and 2 should hold more strongly for participants whose parents
(and previous generations) are from the town.
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5 Cooperation with Insiders and Outsiders
5.1 Differences in Group Contributions
We begin by showing histograms of the joint contribution for the different experiments.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of joint contributions to the outsider and insider groups for
Kekri and Sarwar. The outsider group in both towns is composed of four members: the
subject, a member from their own town and two members from the other town. So both
Kekri and Sarwar’s outsider group includes two people from Kekri and two from Sarwar.
This corresponds to experiment (B) for them.
As seen in the graphs in the first column of Figure 5, people in Kekri are more likely to
contribute sums closer to the pareto-efficient outcome of 150 rupees when matched in out-
sider groups with people from Sarwar. Forty-four percent of Kekri subjects contributed 100
rupees to the outsiders group and another 16 percent gave the pareto-efficient contribution.
In comparison, 48 percent of Sarwar subjects contributed 50 rupees and another 3 percent
chose the free-riding contribution of 0 rupees when matched in outsider groups with people
from Kekri. Subjects in Sarwar, a town in former Princely India, thus appear to be less
cooperative in mixed town outsider groups than subjects in Kekri, a town in former British
India.
The second column of Figure 5 shows participants’ joint contribution to the insider group,
i.e., experiment (A). One pattern immediately jumps out. Subjects contribute significantly
more to their insider group than outsider group. This is true for both Kekri and Sarwar.
In laboratory settings in the United States, early experimental work found individuals were
more cooperative in groups with strangers than partners (Andreoni 1988). Some studies
have confirmed those early findings and others have found opposite results (Fershtman and
Gneezy 2001). Although our insider and outsider group can be viewed as a partner and
stranger style experiment, there is a key difference. We are not matching people as partners
in a lab setting, rather our insider group consists of people from the same town where families
have lived together for generations. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that
Indian subjects are more cooperative with insiders.
Compared to the outsider group contributions, the difference between Kekri and Sarwar
in the insider group is less striking. In both towns, almost fifty percent of subjects contribute
100 rupees. An additional 19 percent give the pareto-efficient contribution of 150 rupees in
Sarwar compared to 29 percent in Kekri. Again this would suggest subjects in Kekri are
more cooperative even in insider groups compared to Sarwar. Although we offer subjects
only a discrete option for their joint contribution namely 0, 50, 100, or 150 rupees, our
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findings are in line with other studies of single-shot public goods games (Andreoni 2008).
These studies find contributions ranging from 40 to 60 percent of the initial endowment.
Our contributions fall on the higher end of this range at 50 to 60 percent of the 150 rupees
endowment across the experiments.
In Figure 6 we show the same distributions for Sarwar and Shahpura, both towns located
in former Princely India. In this case the other town outsider group for both includes two
individuals from Sarwar and two from Shahpura corresponding to their experiment (C).
As seen in the first column, the distribution of joint contributions to the outsider group
are remarkably similar for Sarwar and Shahpura. We do not observe the difference seen in
Figure 5 between Kekri and Sarwar. As described in the theory section, experiment (C) in
Sarwar and Shahpura offers another test of our hypotheses. If we are observing differences
in cooperative behavior on account of the historical legacy of direct and indirect colonial
rule, then we should not find differences in cooperation within outsider groups between
Sarwar and Shahpura, both towns of former Princely India. And, the histograms in Figure
6 confirm that.
Table 3 summarizes the different contributions in the Kekri-Sarwar (experiment B) and
the Sarwar-Shahpura (experiment C) mixed outsider group experiments. We also report the
contributions from the insider group experiment and the share of individuals in each town
that contributed more to their insider group than outsider group. In columns (3) and (6) we
report p-values from the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test on differences between Kekri-Sarwar
in (3) and Sarwar-Shahpura in (6). To assess the importance of historical ties, we also
summarize the experimental contributions based on a subject’s family ties to the town; i.e.,
whether their parents are from the town or not. This is shown in the second and third panel
of Table 3. If the mechanism leading to more or less cooperation with outsider groups is on
account of historical informal and formal institutional differences, then we expect to observe
differences based on a subject’s family ties to the town.
In Sarwar and Kekri outsider groups (experiment (B)), the mean joint contribution is
78 rupees in Sarwar compared to 85 rupees in Kekri. Subjects with strong generational
ties to each town are driving this difference. As seen in the second panel of Table 2, the
average contribution to the outsider group is 77 rupees in Sarwar compared to 86 rupees in
Kekri for individuals whose parents at least are from the town. In comparison, the average
contributions to the outsider group is almost identical for individuals whose parents are not
from the town (81 rupees in Sarwar compared to 80 rupees in Kekri). We observe no such
difference in contributions to outsider groups in the Sarwar and Shahpura experiment for
individuals whose parents are from the town. Average contributions to the mixed outsider
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group are 76 rupees in Sarwar compared to 79 rupees in Shahpura. As seen in column
(3) and (6), the difference in contribution to the outsider group between Kekri and Sarwar
is significant, but not between Sarwar-Shahpura. We find no evidence that Kekri subjects
whose parents are not from the towns cooperate more or less in outsider groups than subjects
in Sarwar (the average contribution in both towns is 80 rupees the bottom panel of table 3).
This is also true for Sarwar and Shahpura. Subjects in Kekri and Shahpura whose parents
are not from the town cooperate more with insider groups than Sarwar subjects.
Figures 7 and 8 shows these differences using graphs. These graphs show the contribu-
tions to mixed outsider groups broken by whether a subject’s parents are from the town or
not, and whether a subject has lived her entire life in the town. These pictures confirm the
general finding. The difference in contribution to outsider groups between Kekri and Sarwar
is driven by individuals with long standing ties to the town namely their parents and grand-
parents are from the town, and they have lived in the town their entire life. Reassuringly,
we observe so such differences in Sarwar and Shahpura for subjects with strong historical
ties to the town.
5.2 Ordered Probit Results
Analyses of results from lab experiments often do not control for background characteristics
of subjects. Since our setting is unusual in being a “lab in the field” experiment, we col-
lected demographic information on participants including gender, education, marital status,
religion, caste and strength of familial ties to the town. Table 4 presents the average for
these demographic variables by town along with p-values from the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test. We observe no significant differences across towns by gender, marital status, whether
they live in a joint family and whether they are self-employed. We observe some differences
by age, education and religion. Sarwar and Shahpura had more Muslim participants than
Kekri, which had more Scheduled Caste participants (castes that traditionally are at the
bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy). There are no significant differences across towns in
participant ties to the town and community. Finally, relatively more participants from Kekri
trust other people from their town compared to in Sarwar and Shahpura.
Since town specific demographics could be correlated with individual decision-making, we
also present results using ordered probit regressions. Contributions in our case are ordinal
outcomes increasing from 0 (low) to 150 (high). Since we observe very few individuals
selecting 0, we combine 0 and 50 into a single category for the ordered probit regressions. In
Table 5, we show the results for Kekri and Sarwar focusing on the outsider group experiment
(B) in the top panel, and insider home town group in the bottom panel (experiment A). All
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the regressions include an indicator if the insider group experiment (A) was played second.
And, we cluster the standard errors by town and experiment order.
In specification (1), we do not include any demographic controls. Here, the coefficient on
the Sarwar dummy shows that individuals from Sarwar are less likely to contribute 100 and
150 rupees compared to individuals in Kekri. In terms of marginal effects, the probability
of Sarwar participants contributing 100 rupees is 5.4 percentage points less than Kekri
participants. In these calculations the other independent variables are held at their mean
values. We find a similar negative effect of 5 percentage points for 150 rupees. In contrast,
the probability of Sarwar participants contributing 50 rupees is 10 percentage points higher
than for Kekri participants. When we include the demographic controls in specification
(2), the coefficient on Sarwar increases. Now, the probability of participants in Sarwar
contributing 100 rupees is 8 percentage points lower than Kekri, while the probability of
contributing 0 or 50 rupees is 15 percentage points higher.
Specifications (3) to (8) present the results broken down by participant’s ties to the town,
namely whether their parents are from the town ((3) and (4)), whether their grandparents
are from the town ((5) and (6)) and finally whether they have lived their entire life in
the town ((7) and (8)). The coefficient on Sarwar is always negative and significant for
individuals whose parents and grandparents are from the town. In contrast, it is positive
but statistically insignificant for participants who do not have any family ties to the town or
have not lived there their entire life. These regression findings confirm the patterns shown
in Figure 5.
In the second panel of Table 5, we show results on the contribution to the home town
group for Kekri and Sarwar. Our theoretical predictions for differences in insider group
contributions are ambiguous. The results in specifications (1) and (2) suggest participants
in Sarwar are less likely to contribute higher amounts. But unlike the contributions to
the outsider group, these results are driven by individuals without family ties to the town.
Individuals that moved to Sarwar are less likely to cooperate with their home town group as
compared to individuals that moved to Kekri. This could be related to stronger community
and family ties in Princely India that make it difficult for people that move to these towns.
In Table 6 we present the experimental findings for the outsider groups in Sarwar and
Shahpura (experiment (C)). Unlike Table 5, we observe no significant difference in contri-
butions to the outsider group between Sarwar and Shahpura. The indicator on Sarwar is
insignificant in most of the specifications other than specification (6). But that regression
focuses on individuals whose grandparents are not from the town. So the mechanism is
unlikely to be driven by some long standing cultural difference between the two towns. The
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bottom panel of Table 6 shows the results on contributions to the insider home town group.
Sarwar participants contribute smaller amounts to their home groups compared to those in
Shahpura. But, the results are not always robust for example to demographic controls in
specification (2). And, the coefficient on Sarwar changes sign from negative to positive in
some sub-samples such as parents from town (specification (3)) compared to grandparents
from town (specification (4)). It is difficult to draw strong conclusions from these results.
In the final set of regressions, we focus on a simple indicator for whether participants
contributed more to their home town group versus mixed town outsider group. These
results shown in Table 7 use probit regression models. In the top panel, we focus on Kekri-
Sarwar (indicator for whether contribution in experiment (A) was greater than contribution
in experiment (B)). The bottom panel shows the same results for Sarwar and Shahpura
(indicator for whether contribution in experiment (A) was greater than contribution in
experiment (C)). Focusing on all participants, the probability of contributing more to the
insider group is two percentage points higher in Sarwar compared to Kekri in specification (1)
excluding the demographic controls. This increases to five percentage points in specification
(2) with the demographic controls.
The more interesting results are for the split samples, where the sign on Sarwar changes
from positive to negative depending on whether participants had family ties to the town or
not. In each sample corresponding to family ties or living entire life in the town (specifica-
tions (3), (5) and (7)), participants in Sarwar contribute significantly more to home town
than mixed town outsider groups as compared to those in Kekri. However, among partici-
pants with no family ties to the town or those that moved to the town, we find the opposite
effects. Such individuals contribute less to their home town group relative to mixed town
outsider group in Sarwar as compared to Kekri. For example, the probability of individuals
contributing more to their home town groups is 44 percentage points lower in Sarwar com-
pared to Kekri for those that have not lived their entire life in the town (specification (8)).
In comparison, the probability of individuals contributing more to their home town groups
is 16 percentage points higher in Sarwar compared to Kekri for those that have lived their
entire life in the town (specification (7)).
We find no such pattern in the Sarwar-Shahpura comparison shown in the second half
of Table 7. The coefficient on Sarwar is insignificant for all participants and for participants
with family ties to the town. We find negative coefficients on Sarwar among participants that
moved to the town and had no family ties to the town. While it seems that participants that
moved to Sarwar are less predisposed to their fellow town members, it is unclear whether
we can draw strong conclusions about the experience of movers from these results.
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6 Conclusion
This paper exploits a natural experiment of a historical boundary to study whether norms
derived from historical institutional settings persist in the long run. We run a “lab in the
field” public goods game in three towns along a former border separating British India
and Princely India. We find that town participants from the Princely India side of the
border contribute lower amounts to mixed groups compared to town participants from the
British India side. When we split the participants by their family ties to the towns, we find
our results are driven by participants whose parents or grandparents are from these towns.
This suggests an intergenerational family transmission of culture, norms and values. Older
generations of towns people were exposed to more developed systems of public taxation and
the presence of outsiders in British India, and they have passed these values to their children
and grandchildren.
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Figure 1: Map of India, 1915
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Figure 2: Map of Rajputana
Source: Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1931
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Figure 3: Contemporary Town Locations
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Figure 4: Experimental Handout
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Figure 5: Histograms of Contribution, Kekri and Sarwar
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Figure 6: Histograms of Contribution, Sarwar and Shahpura
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Figure 7: Histograms by Family Ties to Town
Figure 8: Histograms by Lived Entire Life in Town
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Table 1: Characteristics of Towns
1931 Census of India
Population % Hindu % Muslim % Christian % Male
British India
Kekri 7,179 73.88 26.03 0.13 50.76
Princely India
Sarwar-Kishangarh State 4,000 71.50 21.25 0.00 52.15
Shahpura - Shahpura State 9,298 77.37 17.25 0.01 50.43
2011 Census of India
Population Households % SC % ST % Male
Kekri-Ajmer District 41,890 7,577 18.10 0.90 50.93
Sarwar-Ajmer District 20,372 3,605 14.88 3.95 51.38
Shahpura-Bhilwara District 30,320 5,671 19.29 2.66 50.39





Town Polity Order N
Kekri British Kekri-Sarwar-Shahpura 80
India Sarwar-Kekri-Shahpura 74
Sarwar Princely Sarwar-Kekri-Shahpura 100
State Kekri-Sarwar-Shahpura 100
Shahpura Princely Shahpura-Kekri-Sarwar 100
State Kekri-Shahpura-Sarwar 100
Notes: Home town groups consist of four players from the
same town. Mixed town groups consist of two players includ-
ing subject from home town grouped with two subjects from
other town. So for Kekri order Kekri-Sarwar-Shahpura, the
first experiment group is where everyone is from Kekri, the sec-
ond experiment group is where subject and one group member
are from Kekri, the other two are from Sarwar, and the third
experiment is where subject and one group member are from
Kekri, the other two are from Shahpura.
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Table 3: Contributions to Joint Account
British Princely Princely Princely
India State State State
Kekri Sarwar p-value Sarwar Shahpura p-value
Contribution to Mixed 84.7 78.3 0.074 76.3 78.0 0.591
Group (Outsiders) (3.24) (2.52) (2.67) (2.87)
As % of Endowment 56% 52% 51% 52%
Contribution to 100.7 93.0 0.073 93.0 96.5 0.349
Insider Group (3.06) (2.58) (2.58) (2.80)
As % of Endowment 67% 62% 62% 64%
More to Home (0/1) 0.40 0.41 0.720 0.41 0.40 0.760
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 154 200 200 200
Parents are from Town
Contribution to Mixed 85.8 77.3 0.055 76.3 78.7 0.530
Group (Outsiders) (3.90) (2.94) (3.16) (3.23)
As % of Endowment 57% 52% 51% 52%
Contribution to 96.9 93.5 0.528 93.5 94.9 0.733
Insider Group (3.40) (3.06) (3.06) (3.20)
As % of Endowment 65% 62% 62% 63%
More to Home (0/1) 0.36 0.44 0.222 0.42 0.36 0.281
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 113 139 157 139
Parents are not from Town
Contribution to Mixed 80.4 80.6 0.995 73.5 72.5 0.809
Group (Outsiders) (7.43) (5.42) (5.48) (6.44)
As % of Endowment 54% 54% 49% 48%
Contribution to 108.9 87.8 0.028 87.8 103.8 0.045
Insider Group (8.15) (4.95) (4.95) (5.77)
As % of Endowment 73% 59% 59% 69%
More to Home (0/1) 0.46 0.35 0.313 0.37 0.55 0.087
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 28 49 49 40
Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses.
p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics - Demographics


















Female 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.387 0.180 0.611
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age, 15-25 0.34 0.3 0.53 0.378 0.001** 0.000**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Age, 26-40 0.43 0.28 0.31 0.005** 0.0215* 0.585
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age, 40+ 0.23 0.41 0.17 0.000** 0.141 0.000**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Married 0.68 0.7 0.69 0.639 0.791 0.828
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Joint Family 0.35 0.43 0.39 0.109 0.508 0.310
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Primary Educ 0.18 0.27 0.26 0.04* 0.073 0.734
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secondary Educ 0.39 0.41 0.32 0.698 0.174 0.062
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Higher Secondary Educ 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.043* 0.898 0.0219*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Self Employed 0.31 0.38 0.28 0.143 0.605 0.0337*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Muslim 0.03 0.34 0.45 0.000** 0.000** 0.032
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Scheduled Caste 0.52 0.12 0.18 0.000** 0.000** 0.067
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Scheduled Tribe 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.0135* 0.180 0.178
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Atleast Grandparents from 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.274 0.616 0.514
Town (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Atleast Parents from Town 0.8 0.74 0.8 0.189 0.920 0.181
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lived Entire Life in Town 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.908 0.102 0.106
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Trust people from own town 0.84 0.77 0.73 0.083 0.0103* 0.356
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Know people from Kekri . 0.61 0.43 . . 0.000**
. (0.03) (0.04)
Know people from Sarwar 0.54 . 0.35 . 0.000** .
(0.04) . (0.03)
Know people from Shahpura 0.42 0.31 . 0.000** . .
(0.04) (0.03) .
Observations 154 200 200
Notes: Standard errors of mean in parentheses.
p-values from Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
30
Table 5: Ordered Probit, Contribution to Mixed Town and Home Town Groups, Kekri and Sarwar
All Participants Parents from Town Grandparents from Town Entire Life in Town
Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Joint Pot (0/50, 100, 150) in Mixed Town Outsider Group
Sarwar -0.264*** -0.397*** -0.609*** 0.123 -0.572** -0.081 -0.504*** 0.157
(Princely India) (0.052) (0.094) (0.196) (0.325) (0.287) (0.080) (0.102) (0.123)
Order 0.099 0.038 0.141 0.044 -0.143 0.368*** 0.110** 0.107
(0.060) (0.080) (0.128) (0.065) (0.145) (0.045) (0.053) (0.094)
Cut 1 -0.202*** -0.637* -0.903** 0.270 -1.091*** 0.053 -0.773*** -0.225
(0.054) (0.347) (0.353) (0.474) (0.295) (0.299) (0.238) (0.490)
Cut 2 1.064*** 0.682 0.511 1.438*** 0.408 1.194*** 0.542 1.288***
(0.107) (0.460) (0.448) (0.509) (0.409) (0.450) (0.375) (0.445)
Observations 354 354 252 77 191 138 270 84
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Joint Pot (0/50, 100, 150) in Home Town Insider Group
Sarwar -0.213*** -0.246*** -0.093 -0.936*** 0.261 -0.806*** -0.124 -0.756***
(Princely India) (0.015) (0.090) (0.131) (0.241) (0.184) (0.144) (0.146) (0.226)
Order 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.057 -0.371*** 0.158** -0.207*** 0.114*** -0.051
(0.010) (0.032) (0.047) (0.091) (0.072) (0.071) (0.023) (0.079)
Cut 1 -0.603*** -0.450 -0.173 -1.195* -0.117 -0.834 -0.392 -0.751**
(0.043) (0.353) (0.360) (0.647) (0.439) (0.510) (0.429) (0.318)
Cut 2 0.656*** 0.854** 1.253*** 0.079 1.283*** 0.607 1.038** 0.245
(0.032) (0.345) (0.322) (0.548) (0.385) (0.451) (0.413) (0.356)
Observations 354 354 252 77 191 138 270 84
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by town*experiment order in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Order is an indicator if the home town group experiment was played second. Demographic controls include indicators for male,
age 15-25, age 26-40, married, joint family, secondary education, upper secondary education, self employed, Muslim, scheduled
caste and scheduled tribe.
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Table 6: Ordered Probit, Contribution to Mixed Town and Home Town Groups, Sarwar and Shahpura
All Participants Parents from Town Grandparents from Town Entire Life in Town
Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Joint Pot (0/50, 100, 150) in Mixed Town Outsider Group
Sarwar -0.099 -0.056 -0.114 0.033 -0.093 -0.133*** -0.130 0.093
(Princely India) (0.077) (0.112) (0.160) (0.088) (0.183) (0.002) (0.137) (0.238)
Order 0.186** 0.182** 0.232 0.015 0.069 0.310*** 0.278* -0.192
(0.080) (0.078) (0.163) (0.087) (0.189) (0.005) (0.146) (0.213)
Cut 1 0.131*** -0.094 0.095 0.355*** -0.094 0.455*** 0.134 0.162
(0.048) (0.191) (0.107) (0.058) (0.125) (0.017) (0.086) (0.222)
Cut 2 1.176*** 0.980*** 1.239*** 1.129*** 1.088*** 1.333*** 1.178*** 1.252***
(0.133) (0.187) (0.245) (0.140) (0.298) (0.055) (0.204) (0.309)
Observations 400 400 296 89 227 158 319 81
Dependent Variable: Contribution to Joint Pot (0/50, 100, 150) in Home Town Insider Group
Sarwar -0.114*** -0.057 -0.055** -0.476*** 0.031* -0.425*** -0.047*** -0.344***
(Princely India) (0.024) (0.055) (0.028) (0.151) (0.018) (0.030) (0.005) (0.102)
Order 0.039 0.108** 0.081*** -0.282** 0.107*** -0.168*** 0.058*** -0.048
(0.024) (0.042) (0.026) (0.137) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.102)
Cut 1 -0.528*** -0.271 -0.470*** -0.968*** -0.379*** -0.858*** -0.525*** -0.559***
(0.046) (0.229) (0.069) (0.103) (0.060) (0.092) (0.066) (0.080)
Cut 2 0.719*** 1.004*** 0.789*** 0.467*** 0.875*** 0.512*** 0.749*** 0.595***
(0.049) (0.263) (0.097) (0.178) (0.091) (0.073) (0.076) (0.169)
Observations 400 400 296 89 227 158 319 81
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by town*experiment order in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Order is an indicator if the home town group experiment was played second. Demographic controls include indicators for male, age
15-25, age 26-40, married, joint family, secondary education, upper secondary education, self employed, Muslim, scheduled caste and
scheduled tribe.
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Table 7: Probit - Indicator for More to Home Town Group than Mixed Town Group
All Participants Parents from Town Grandparents from Town Entire Life in Town
Yes No Yes No Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kekri and Sarwar
Sarwar 0.050*** 0.157*** 0.491*** -0.807*** 0.831*** -0.463*** 0.420** -1.322**
(Princely India) (0.018) (0.048) (0.143) (0.084) (0.215) (0.163) (0.190) (0.667)
Order -0.053*** 0.010 -0.089 -0.241 0.260*** -0.482*** -0.011 -0.153
(0.018) (0.060) (0.072) (0.305) (0.088) (0.100) (0.103) (0.225)
Observations 354 354 252 77 191 138 270 84
Sarwar and Shahpura
Sarwar 0.042 0.109 0.148 -0.453*** 0.286 -0.318*** 0.212 -0.590***
(Princely India) (0.130) (0.164) (0.131) (0.130) (0.183) (0.054) (0.148) (0.047)
Order -0.325** -0.233 -0.385*** -0.243* -0.223 -0.504*** -0.439*** 0.089*
(0.130) (0.161) (0.132) (0.128) (0.182) (0.055) (0.148) (0.046)
Observations 400 400 296 89 227 158 319 81
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by town*experiment order in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Order is an indicator if the home town group experiment was played second. Demographic controls include indicators for male,
age 15-25, age 26-40, married, joint family, secondary education, upper secondary education, self employed, Muslim, scheduled
caste and scheduled tribe.
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